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This paper investigates the short-term market reaction to UK acquirers announcing domestic 
and foreign mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from 2000-2010. We define acquirers as value, 
moderate and glamour acquirers based on equally weighted market-to-book terciles. We find 
that value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers during and after the M&A announcement. 
We also focus on the impact of institutional ownership and find that higher domestic, foreign 
and total institutional ownership leads to lower market reaction to M&A announcements. We 
also find that long-term institutional investors lead to a higher post-announcement market 
performance. Finally, we find that a higher domestic institutional ownership mitigates the 
typical poor short-term performance following M&A announcements of glamour acquirers. 
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A surge in M&A activity since the 1990s has imitated an extensive literature that addresses a 
number of issues surrounding M&As. For instance, Andrade et al. (2001) show that shares is a 
preferred method of payment while Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that acquirers use their 
overvalued equity in order to acquire targets and their respective assets at a discount. Emery and 
Switzer (1999) suggest that acquirers exploit information asymmetries for selecting the deal 
payment method with expectations of higher abnormal returns. Therefore, the choice of 
SD\PHQWPHWKRGRI0	$VFDQVLJQLILFDQWO\LQIOXHQFHWKHVKDUHKROGHUV¶ZHDOWKDWWKHWLPHRI
the M&A announcement and during the post-merger period.
1
 Evidence in the literature 
supports the asymmetric information hypothesis that acquirers with cash offers experience 
higher abnormal returns than acquirers with share offers. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) 
report that both bidder and target firms have higher returns with cash payments compared to 
equity payments. Similarly, Houston and Ryngaert (1997) find that acquirers outperform 
when a greater proportion of cash is used for acquiring target firms. 
Moeller et al. (2007) find a negative relationship between information asymmetry and the 
stock performance of acquirers of public firms. Andrade et al. (2001) show that acquirers using 
shares in the M&A payment, have a negative stock performance over the three days  
surrounding the M&A announcement, while acquirers with pure equity financing have a small 
positive performance. Moreover, acquirers that use stock as payment for M&As significantly 
underperform over a five year period compared to acquirers that use cash as the payment 
method (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). However, using equity as payment for M&As benefits 
acquirers during the announcement period when targets are difficult to value ± especially 
                                                 
1 Announcement returns to shareholders vary significantly across different samples and periods. See Kennedy and 
Limmack (1996); Sudarsanam et al. (1996); Rau and Vermaelen (1998); Akhigbe and Martin (2000); Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003); Conn et al. (2005); and Freund et al. (2007). 
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private targets (Officer et al., 2009). Therefore, a stock payment can mitigate the potential risk 
of a target firm being overvalued.  
While cross-border M&As can be an important entry mode for foreign markets they are 
related to higher levels of risk and uncertainty for both acquirers and targets. The wealth effects 
of cross-border M&As are lower compared to domestic M&As (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004). Cakici et al. (1996) find that while US acquirers do not gain from cross-border M&As, 
foreign firms acquiring US targets have a significant and positive market performance, in line 
with Akihigbe and Martin (2000). Moreover, Black et al. (2007) report that US acquirers 
engaging in cross-border M&As experience significantly negative long-run post-merger 
abnormal returns. However, Francoeur (2006) finds that Canadian firms acquiring foreign 
targets create great efficiency gains and increase their shareholder value while there are no 
sustained gains or losses for domestic M&As. In the UK, Conn et al. (2005) report negative 
announcement and post-announcement returns for domestic and public M&A targets, zero 
announcement returns and negative post-merger returns for cross-border public deals, and 
positive announcement returns for private targets. Meanwhile, foreign acquirers with UK 
targets have negative announcement returns (Danbolt, 1995), and UK firms acquiring domestic 
targets outperform their counterparts that acquire US and European targets (Aw and 
Chatterjee, 2004).  
In the UK, which is the focal point of this study, the majority (approximately 80%) of target 
firms are privately held companies (Chang, 1998; Draper and Paudyal, 2008). Chang (1998) 
argues that takeovers of private targets via share payment tend to create large block 
shareholders as the ownership of private targets is highly concentrated. It is widely 
documented that large shareholders and institutional investors in particular can significantly 
LQIOXHQFHILUPV¶ decision making and especially on M&As (Stulz et al., 1990; Ambrose and 
Megginson, 1992; Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira et al., 2010; Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015). 
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Moreover, institutional investors can be active investors and discourage poor decisions made 
by entrenched managers (Jensen, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Duggal and Millar, 1999; Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003). The shareholdings of institutional investors in the US and the UK has increased 
significantly since the 1990s (Aguilera et al., 2006) with approximately 50% of the UK equity 
markets being held by institutional investors (Andriosopoulos and Yang, 2015). Nevertheless, 
UK managers are more restricted compared to their US counterparts due to the greater 
influence and monitoring of institutional investors (Short and Keasey, 1999). 
In support of the monitoring argument, the positive relationship between acquirHU ILUPV¶
stock returns with share payments and the new block shareholders from the target company 
suggests that large shareholders are effective monitors (Chang, 1998). Duggal and Millar 
(1999) report a positive relationship between institutional ownershiSDQGDFTXLUHUV¶DEQRUPDO
returns in the US but argue this positive relationship is driven by firm size and the DFTXLUHUV¶
listing on the S&P 500 index, casting doubt on the active monitoring role in the M&As¶ 
transactions. However, Kohers and Kohers (2001) show that acquirers with higher institutional 
ownership have superior post-merger long-run performance. Meanwhile, institutional investors 
have a significantly lower share turnover rate in the UK compared to the US (Black and 
Coffee, 1994; Aguilera et al., 2006) suggesting they can have a key role in the monitoring of 
firms DQGILUPV¶GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ  
We assess the monitoring role of institutional ownership on acquirers¶ SHUIRUPDQFH
reflected by the market reaction during the announcement period of M&As and the short-term 
post-announcement period. Moreover, we delve deeper into the impact of institutional 
ownership by splitting institutional ownership between domestic and foreign investors. We find 
that total, foreign, and domestic institutional ownership has a negative impact on the market 
reaction during the M&A announcement. However, during the short-term post-announcement 
period acquirers with greater total and domestic institutional investors outperform their peers. 
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In addition, the results show that acquirer firms with higher ownership concentration by 
long-term institutional investors have a smaller market reaction during the M&A 
announcement but outperform their peers over the 20 days following the announcement, 
consistent with Gaspar et al. (2005). Overall, our results suggest that a greater presence of 
institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon reduces information asymmetries 
and equity mispricing during the announcement, as evident by a small price reaction. 
Meanwhile the positive post-announcement performance is due to institutional and long-term 
institutional investors being effective monitors, therefore decreasing the likelihood of an M&A 
being a poor decision and resulting in a positive market performance. 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Del Guercio (1996) suggest that institutional investors are 
PRUHOLNHO\WRVKLIWWKHLULQYHVWPHQWWRZDUGµJRRG¶RUµJODPRXU¶HTXLW\UDWKHUWKDQEDVLQJWKHLU
investment decisions on objective risk characteristics, especially for banks and mutual funds. 
Moreover, Carline et al. (2009) report a poor performance for acquirers that target domestic 
firms and have lower growth opportunities. Glamour acquirers are firms with a high market 
valuation measured by the price-to-earnings ratio or the market-to-book value ratio 
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) and are considered to have higher future growth 
opportunities and experience higher announcement returns (Lang et al. 1989; Servaes, 1991; 
Megginson et al., 2004). Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that glamour acquirers experience 
significantly higher announcement returns than value acquirers but with a reversal in 
performance over a three year period following the announcement. Kohers and Kohers (2001) 
find that the poor post-announcement performance of glamour acquirers is driven by the 
DGYHUVHHIIHFWVRIDFTXLUHUV¶agency problems. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find that UK 
glamour acquirers experience negative long-run returns following M&A announcements. 
However, Conn et al. (2005) show that glamour acquirers perform poorly only when 
acquiring public firms, as opposed to private targets. Moreover, Alexandridis et al. (2008) do 
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QRWILQGDVLJQLILFDQWUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQDFTXLUHUV¶UHWXUQV during the M&A announcement 
and their market-to-book value. 
We assess whether institutional ownership has a varying impact between value and 
glamour acquirers and their respective market performance during the short-term 
announcement and post-announcement periods. We find that value acquirers consistently 
outperform glamour acquirers during the announcement and post-announcement periods. Our 
findings are consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). However, our results show that 
glamour acquirers with a higher concentration of domestic institutional investors have a better 
post-announcement performance.  
In summary, our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we assess the impact of 
institutional ownership on the market reaction to M&A announcements while providing a 
further breakdown of institutional investors between domestic and foreign investors. Second, 
we assess the short-term market performance of value, moderate, and glamour firms, 
surrounding M&A announcements and evaluate the marginal influence of domestic 
institutional ownership on glamour firms. Third, we ensure our findings are robust by 
controlling for an extensive number of deal-specific and firm-specific characteristics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and sets 
the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. In section 4 we provide and discuss the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Glamour acquirers 
Firms that are perceived to have high growth opportunities typically have high price 
valuations reflecting their past earnings and cash flow performance, and the expectation of 
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sustainable future growth. The positive expectation of future growth allows glamour acquirers 
to make value-decreasing acquisitions for which the market may not penalise them 
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). This is in line with the hypothesis that managerial hubris 
plays an important role in the decision making process of glamour acquirer firms when 
managers may be overconfident about their ability to manage an M&A deal (Roll, 1986). 
Furthermore, firms with high market-to-book ratios are subject to higher information 
asymmetries because a large proportion of their market value comes from intangible assets 
(Moeller et al., 2004). Therefore, these firms are more likely to be overvalued (Dong et al., 
2006). Due to information asymmetries, managers of glamour firms may know that their 
shares are trading at unsustainable levels and will try to convert shares into real assets. This is 
one of the reasons why glamour acquirers prefer to make share payments for acquiring firms 
(Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). Moreover, firm takeovers can be 
XVHGWRDWWUDFWLQYHVWRUV¶VFUXWLQ\, potentially leading to the revaluation of undervalued firms 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2008).  
GODPRXUILUPV¶W\SLFDOO\KLJKJURZWKin cash flows and earnings can reassure managers 
about their ability to handle an M&A and SRWHQWLDOO\HQKDQFHPDQDJHUV¶overconfidence. In 
contrast, value acquirers are more prudent when making takeover decisions and therefore are 
more likely to create value for shareholders (Lakonishok et al., 1992). Pástor and Veronesi 
 ILQG HYLGHQFH WKDW ILUPV¶ PDUNHW-to-book value increases with the uncertainty about 
average profitability as well as the idiosyncratic return volatility, especially for firms that do 
not pay dividends. 
According to the performance extrapolation hypothesis, investors reward or penalise 
firms based on the belief that past performance will persist into the future. Therefore, 
investors over-extrapolate past positive performance of glamour firms considering that it can 
be sustained in the future. Similarly, investors penalise value stocks based on the idea that 
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poor recent performance will persist. Lang et al. (1989), Servaes (1991), and Megginson et al. 
(2004) find that glamour acquirers earn significantly higher announcement period returns than 
value acquirers. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that glamour acquirers underperform over 
WKH WKUHH \HDUV IROORZLQJ DQ 0	$ ZKLFK WKH DXWKRUV DWWULEXWH WR WKH PDUNHW¶V KLJKHU
expectations due to the over-H[WUDSRODWLRQRIWKHJODPRXUILUPV¶SDVWSHUIormance. However, 
these findings contradict those of Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). Freund et al. (2007) report 
significant positive announcement returns between 1985 and 1998 for US acquirers involved in 
cross-border M&As, especially for value acquirers, which is supported by Francis et al. (2008). 
However, Alexandridis et al. (2008) do not find a significant relationship between 
market-to-ERRN YDOXH DQG DFTXLUHUV¶ DQQRXQFHPHQW UHWXUQV RYHU D ILYH-day window 
surrounding the M&A announcement.  
Therefore, we test whether the over-extrapolation theory explains the M&A 
announcement returns and whether institutional ownership can mitigate the information 
asymmetries and relevant revaluations stemming from the M&A announcements. We 
formulate our hypotheses as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Glamour acquirers experience lower abnormal returns during the M&A 
announcement. 
Hypothesis 2: Glamour acquirers with higher institutional ownership experience higher 
abnormal returns during the M&A announcement. 
2.2. Institutional Ownership  
Institutional investors can act as effective monitors RIPDQDJHUV¶EHKDYLRUDQGVWUDWHJ\, and 
therefore can influence both current and future firm performance (Jensen, 1991; Bushee, 1998; 
Hartzell and Starks, 2003). For instance, Bushee (1998) finds a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and R&D expenditures, suggesting that institutional investors can 
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UHGXFHPDQDJHUV¶P\RSLFEHKDYLRUDQGIRFXVRQVKRUW-term performance. Moreover, greater 
institutional ownership is linked to higher audit quality (Kane and Velury, 2004) and higher 
R&D expenditures (Hansen and Hill, 1991), suggesting that institutional investors can act as 
effective monitors. Potter (1992) finds that a greater concentration of institutional investors 
reduces the informativeness of share prices prior to earnings announcements and suggests that 
the sophistication of institutional investors is unlikely to pre-empt the information content of 
earnings announcements that trigger the share price variability at the time of the 
announcement. Moreover, the author finds a positive correlation between firm size and 
institutional ownership. Similarly, Cready (1994) and Hessel and Norman (1992) find that 
institutional investors prefer larger firms, such as S&P 500 constituents, in which to invest. 
Lev (1988) suggests that, compared to individual shareholders, institutional investors are 
better informed due to their lower marginal costs of gathering information. Diamond and 
Verrechia (1991) and Kim and Verrechia (1994) suggest that increased institutional 
ownership is positively associated with expanded disclosure which can reduce information 
DV\PPHWULHVDQGLQFUHDVHILUPV¶VWRFNOLTXLGLW\/HYDUJXHVWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV
are preferred by the firms in which they invested, due to their better monitoring performance 
and the requirement of sophisticated and future-oriented information.   
Regarding M&As, Eakins (1993) finds that institutional investors are important players in 
M&As that involve changes in corporate control. Moreover, institutional investors may act to 
alleviate agency problems and discourage poor management decisions from entrenched 
managers and therefore, higher institutional ownership is positively associated with tender 
offers (Kohers et al., 2007). This is in line with Gaspar et al. (2005) who argue that 
institutional investors can be effective monitors and mitigate the agency costs that arise during 
M&As between shareholders and managers. Stulz et al. (1990) show that higher institutional 
ownership has a positive relationship with lower takeover premiums. Duggal and Millar (1999) 
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show that institutional ownership has a positive impact on acquirerV¶UHWXUQV but find that this 
positive relationship is primarily driven by firm size. Chen et al. (2007) find that firms with 
independent long-term oriented institutional investors outperform those with moderate (grey) 
or short-term oriented investors over the three years following an M&A announcement. 
Similarly, Gaspar et al. (2005) find that acquirers with more short-term institutional investors 
experience lower announcement returns which the authors attribute to the weaker monitoring 
that can allow managers to make acquisitions that can damage the value of the firm. 
Following Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) we test for possible 
effects of concentrated institutional ownership and use the sum of holdings of the five largest 
(top 5) institutional investors
2
. We also use the holdings of the largest institutional investor. 
Therefore we assess the impact of institutional ownership on the market valuation during the 
short-term window surrounding the M&A announcement. We state our hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Greater institutional ownership KDV D SRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ DFTXLUHUV¶
short-term post-announcement performance.  
Hypothesis 4: Long-WHUP LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV KDYH D SRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ DFTXLUHUV¶
short-term post-announcement performance. 
2.3. Payment Method 
If all investors enjoy the same information (in a perfect market) the method of payment 
for an M&A should have no impact on the wealth creation. In reality, both acquirer and target 
firms have different preferences for the deal payment methods due to the existence of 
asymmetric information. For instance, firms are less likely to acquire firms that are foreign 
and privately owned via a share payment (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Reuer et al. (2004) 
                                                 
2 Alternatively we use the ownership of the three largest institutional investors and the results remain qualitatively 
the same.  
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argue that the method of payment used in M&As can significantly influence the valuation of the 
participating firms, consequently affecting the wealth of the participating shareholders.  
Cash or debt financing is preferred, compared to stock financing, as the latter dilutes the 
existing shareholdings and increases the risk of losing control (Huang and Walkling, 1987; 
Franks et al. 1988; Amihud et al., 1990). Chang (1998) suggests that financing an M&A with 
common stock is similar to a private placement of equity because the target is owned by one or 
a small number of shareholders. In the UK, a large proportion of M&A target firms are privately 
held. Therefore, the consideration of avoiding block shareholders and keeping voting power is 
an important factor for using cash offers. When the target firm is acquired with cash, the target 
ILUP¶V shareholders face immediate tax charges as opposed to a stock payment where tax 
charges can be deferred (Fuller et al., 2002). Therefore, the accompanying tax charges lead to 
a higher premium for cash offers than stock offers to compensate target shareholders for the 
immediate payment of taxes, resulting in higher abnormal returns.  
According to Fishman (1989) the key difference between cash and stock financing is that 
a stock¶s value depends on the profitability of M&A deals, while the value of cash does not. 
Therefore, the target firms need to make an efficient decision rejecting or accepting the offer 
as targets and acquirers have asymmetric information. Typically, a cash payment benefits 
acquirers since the market views cash payments as a positive signal of expectations for future 
returns (Conn et al., 2005). There are two main explanations for this. First, acquirers prefer a 
share payment when their stock is overvalued as they try to exploit their information 
advantages by offering stock financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Since acquirers face the risk of incorrectly valuing a target, due to information asymmetries, 
they may prefer a VKDUHSD\PHQWRIIHUEHFDXVHLQWKDWFDVHWKHWDUJHWILUP¶VVKDUHKROGHUVVKDUH
part of the valuation risk of the merged entity (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). However, 
target firms will expect a cash payment ZKHQWKHDFTXLUHUV¶HTXLW\LVXQGHUYDOXHG, leading to 
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payment methods acting as informational signals (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Chemmanur et al. 
(2009) find that acquirers choosing a share payment are overvalued and those using cash 
financing are correctly valued, while a greater overvaluation RIWKHDFTXLUHU¶VVKDUHVLQFUHDVHV
the likelihood of a share payment. The second explanation for the positive impact of cash 
payments is that acquirers may choose to provide share payment when they have less 
information regarding the target¶s value (Hansen, 1987) or a low valuation of the target firm 
(Fishman, 1989). Similarly, Chemmanur et al. (2009) argue that greater information 
asymmetries between acquirers and targets increase the likelihood of a cash offer.  
,UUHVSHFWLYHRIDFTXLUHUV¶SUH-bid financial status, in the UK a cash payment can generate 
higher post-acquisition shareholder returns for acquiring firms over a 3-year period compared 
to share payment (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Abhyankar et al., 2005). As earlier 
discussed, the information asymmetries between the shareholders of acquiring and target 
firms are at the core of the financing decision. However, institutional investors can be 
effective monitors, mitigate information asymmetries and influence both the current and future 
performance of a firm (Jensen, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Gaspar et al., 
2005). Therefore, we test whether the institutional investors affect the signaling and respective 
market reaction to the choice of payment method, cash
3
 or shares, surrounding the M&A 
announcement. We set our hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 5: Acquirers making cash payments experience a higher market reaction to the 
M&A announcement. 
                                                 
3 Following Martin (1996) and Faccio and Masulis (2005), cash payments are defined to include cash, 
non-contingent liabilities and newly issued notes. Moreover, cash payment includes actual cash, debt, assumed 
debt, converted debt and loan notes, as defined in Bureau van Dijk. 
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3. Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1. Sample  
We identify all M&As undertaken by UK listed companies from Bureau Van Dijk (Zephyr) 
from 01/01/2000 to 31/12/2010. The final sample is selected by complying with the following 
conditions: 1) The acquirer has equity ownership records available from Thomson One Banker, 
and both financial records at the year-end prior to the announcement and stock price records 
around the announcement date from Worldscope; 2) The transaction is completed at the end of 
sample period; 3) All acquirers that are financial firms are excluded from the sample (2-dig SIC 
60-69);
4
 4) The deal value is greater than £1 million; 5) Targets are both UK and non-UK firms, 
including listed private and subsidiary firms; 6) The acquirer firms have the stock price records 
for 200 days before the announcement date and 10 days after the announcement date in 
DataStream; and 7) We exclude the deals from the same acquirers within 20 days, as the 
acquirers¶ abnormal return cannot be isolated for a particular target (Fuller et al., 2002). The 
final sample is comprised of 2,582 completed M&As undertaken by UK publicly listed 
companies. The final sample contains 1,519 domestic targets and 1,063 foreign targets.   
 Firm-level institutional ownership characteristics are obtained from Thomson Reuters,
5
 
which compiles information contained quarterly in the 13F historical holder the proportion of 
foreign institutional ownership, low-turnover institutional ownership as well as total 
institutional ownership in each firm at the year-end prior to the deal announcement, as in 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Cornett et al. (2007). Variable descriptions are provided in Table 1.  
                                                 
4  The sample excludes financial industries due to the uniqueness of the industry such as: special asset 
composition, high leverage, and stricter government regulations (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010).  
5 Thomson Reuters has a minimum of 0.015% threshold for UK ILUPV¶RZQHUVKLS record.  
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3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the annual distribution of domestic and cross-border M&As undertaken 
by UK acquirers over our sample period. Overall, the number of M&As is relatively stable 
during the first half of 2000 with a peak in deals in both 2006 and 2007, after which there is a 
trough in M&A activity due to the financial crisis of 2008-09. In 2010 the number of M&As rise 
again to the levels of the early 2000s. Even though domestic deals are the main type of M&As 
across the sample period, the average deal value is higher for cross-border M&As. For instance, 
the total deal value of cross-border transactions accounts for over 79% of the total deal value of 
all M&As undertaken by UK listed companies during our sample period.  
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 highlights the sample features according to the acquirers¶ market-to-book value 
(MTBV) ratio. Following Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), we UDQNDOODFTXLUHUV¶07%9V6 and 
construct the samples into three equally-weighted terciles: Value (low MTBV, 797), Moderate 
(median MTBV, 797) and Glamour (high MTBV, 798). Glamour acquirers have an average 
MTBV ratio of 3.11 compared to 1.08 and 0.51 for moderate and value acquirers respectively. 
Cross-border M&As undertaken by glamour acquirers are greater in frequency and size than the 
other two groups. For instance, the average deal value of cross-border M&As undertaken by 
glamour acquirers (£458.68m) is approximately triple the average deal value of M&As 
undertaken by moderate and value acquirers; however, the latter focus more on domestic 
M&As deals. Secondly, cash is the main payment method in M&As and is especially preferred 
by value acquirers, while the most prevalent use of share payment is found in deals undertaken 
by glamour acquirers. The results are broadly consistent with previous evidence showing that 
glamour firms prefer a share payment ± the payment of shares when the stock price is 
                                                 
6 Both book and market values (BV and MV respectively) are lagged one year relative to the M&A announcement.  
15 
 
overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 
2003). Moreover, the figures show that glamour acquirers are more engaged (172 M&As) in 
the high-tech industry as opposed to value acquirers (82 M&As). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Moreover, we find that value acquirers have a greater presence of institutional investors 
than moderate and glamour acquirers, with the top 5 institutional ownerships being 26.95%, 
25.34% and 24.10% for value, moderate and glamour acquirers, respectively. However, there is 
no significant difference in the total institutional ownership across the three types of acquirers. 
When analyzing further the type of institutional investors, i.e. between domestic and foreign 
investors, we find some discrepancies. In particular, we find that foreign institutional investors 
prefer glamour acquirers whereas domestic institutional investors are more prominent in value 
acquirers. Moreover, we find that value acquirers attract more long-term institutional investors 
(40.68%), as opposed to moderate (40.55%) and glamour (38.29%) acquirers. Similarly, 
short-term investors have a higher presence in glamour acquirers as opposed to value acquirers.   
Finally, we find that glamour acquirers are smaller in size, have lower leverage and higher 
cash ratios
7
 consistent with the existing literature, which suggests that glamour firms usually 
have higher valuations by the market based on their high growth in cash flow and earnings 
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Short-term value creation for the acquirers  
We employ a standard event study of methodology to calculate the cumulative abnormal 
                                                 
7 We use the ratio of Cash and Cash Equivalents adjusted by total assets as a proxy for cash. We also use the ratio 
of Cash and Cash Equivalents adjusted by Net Assets as an alternative proxy for firm liquidity and our results 
(unreported) remain the same. 
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returns (CARs) during the short period around the time of the M&A announcement date. The 
abnormal returns are estimated based on daily dividend-adjusted stock returns with a standard 
OLS market model and the FTSE All Share Index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The 
OLS market model coefficients are estimated over a 250 trading-days window up to the 20 
trading days prior to the M&A announcement day. 
Figure 1 illustrates the cumulative average abnormal returns for acquirers announcing 
domestic and cross-border M&As over the 41-day window (-20, +20) surrounding the 
announcement date. The graph shows that on average domestic M&As enjoy a higher market 
reaction on the day of the announcement, as opposed to cross-border M&As, consistent with 
Conn et al. (2005). However, this is a short-lived reaction as there is a reversal to the 
pre-announcement levels over the 20 days following the announcement. When plotting the 
market reaction across the three types of acquirers (Figure 2), we find that value acquirers 
experience an economically significant market reaction on the day of the announcement which 
persists over the 20-day post-announcement period. This is contrary to the market reaction to 
glamour acquirers where there is an insignificant market reaction followed by a negative 
performance approximately a week following the M&A announcement.  
We assess the market reaction to M&A announcements in more detail in Table 4. Overall, 
we do not find strong evidence of a pre-event out(under)performance but we find strong 
evidence of a positive market reaction across all event windows (-1, +1), (Day 0), and (-5, +5). 
Overall, we find that acquirers enjoy an average 0.598% outperformance during the 3-day event 
window, with domestic M&As having significantly better outperformance (0.763%) compared 
to cross-border deals (0.363%), also consistent with Conn et al. (2005). Similarly, we find that 
value acquirers enjoy a significantly higher market reaction (0.747%) compared to glamour 
acquirers (0.219%). This is consistent with the notion that the UK market over-extrapolates 
DFTXLUHUV¶SDVWSHUIRUPDQFHSULRUWR0	$DQQRXQFHPHQWV(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003), 
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since in the UK most targets are privately held firms and tend to accept the equity of value 
bidders as it is less likely to be overpriced (Chang, 1998).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
During the post-announcement period (+2, 20) there is a reversal in performance which 
dissipates almost all gains from the announcement market reaction. This reversal applies to 
both domestic and cross-border M&As. However, we find that value acquirers retain any gains 
from the market reaction to the announcement, contrary to glamour acquirers which display a 
negative performance of approximately 1% over the 20-day period following the 
announcement. 
We analyze further the performance of domestic and cross-border M&As across the three 
MTBV groups of acquirers: value, moderate and glamour. The results in Table 5 show that 
overall there is no significant difference between domestic and cross-border M&As for each 
acquirer category, with the exception of the moderate acquirers where the market reaction on 
day 0 for domestic deals is approximately threefold compared to cross-border deals. Moreover, 
we find that value and moderate acquirers outperform glamour acquirers during the 
announcement event windows, consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) who find that 
value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers, but FRQWUDU\ WR WKH µRYHU-H[WUDSRODWLRQ¶
hypothesis (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) that suggests markets favor glamour acquirers during 
M&A announcements. Finally, the results confirm the earlier graphical illustration pointing to 
an underperformance for glamour acquirers, mostly driven by cross-border M&As, following 
the deal announcement, as opposed to value and moderate acquirers which retain the gains 
achieved during the deal announcement. 
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
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4.2. Univariate analysis of CARs based on deal and firm characteristics  
Table 6 presents the CARs for the two extended event windows (-1, +1) and (-5, +5) and 
the post-event (+2,+10) for domestic and cross-border M&As, which are calculated for each 
pair of below and above median values of selected ownership and firm characteristics. 
Moreover, the statistics on differences in means are reported. The results show there is no 
difference for different deal sizes for domestic and cross-border deals. Moreover, we find that 
firms with a higher concentration of single, or top 5 institutional ownership outperform those 
acquirers with lower ownership concentration but only in the post-announcement window.  
Firms with higher ownership by domestic institutional investors underperform compared 
to firms with lower domestic institutional ownership during the announcement window of 
domestic only deals. However, there is a smaller reversal for higher domestic institutional 
ownership following the announcement. This is possibly driven by the fact that retail investors 
may overreact to news announcements, such as M&As, leading to readjustment following the 
event. Moreover, we find that firms with higher foreign institutional investors experience a 
lower market reaction on the event window and a lower reversal on the post-event window. This 
is contrary to Ferreira et al. (2010) who find that firms with greater foreign institutional 
ownership experience significantly greater announcement abnormal returns in cross-border 
M&As as foreign institutional investors can help to reduce transaction costs and information 
asymmetry. However, we argue that this mainly because Ferreira et al. (2010) assess the impact 
of foreign institutional investors on the combined (value-weighted) CARs of both acquirers and 
targets, whereas we assess the market reaction on the acquirers only. For instance, the authors 
report a (-1,+1) CAR of -0.78% and 11.81% for acquirers and targets respectively, which shows 
that on average acquirers have a negative market reaction and therefore the relationship 
EHWZHHQ IRUHLJQ LQYHVWRUV DQG WKH PDUNHW YDOXDWLRQ PD\ EH GULYHQ E\ WKH WDUJHWV¶ PDUNHW
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valuation. Moreover, a higher proportion of UK institutional investors have a lower turnover 
rate leading to a lower market reaction for domestic deals (0.376% for the 6-day window) 
similar to the performance of firms with higher total institutional ownership (0.357% for the 
6-day window). 
[Insert Table 6 about here]  
 The evidence from the firm-specific characteristics shows that smaller firms experience a 
higher market reaction when undertaking a cross-border M&A, due to the higher information 
asymmetries. This supports the conclusion of firm size effect in acquisition announcement 
returns by Moeller et al. (2004) who report an approximately 2% higher announcement return 
for smaller acquirer shareholders irrespective of the financing resources and listing status. 
Moreover, value firms outperform glamour firms during the event and post-event windows for 
domestic deals and for the post-event window only for cross-border deals. 
Table 7 reports the CARs for the 3-day (-1, +1) and 6-day (-5, +5) event windows and the 
post-event window (+2, +20) on various deal-specific characteristics sorted E\DFTXLUHUV¶value, 
moderate, and glamour status. The results show that value acquirers with high-tech and 
non-high-tech targets outperform glamour acquirers. For the whole sample, the market reaction 
is positive and significant for firms acquiring high-tech targets (0.45%) and non-high-tech 
targets (0.63%) consistent with Conn et al. (2005). Moreover, we find that value acquirers have 
a positive post-announcement performance for non-high-tech targets (0.33%) while glamour 
acquirers have a negative post-event performance for high-tech targets (-1.45%). Value 
acquirers consistently outperform glamour acquirers that target cross- or intra-industry targets 
and for either a cash or share payment. Moreover, a cash offer outperforms share payment 
deals, especially for glamour acquirers which have negative returns (-1.306%) for share 
payments, consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Andre et al. (2004). Finally, 
deals with unlisted targets outperform deals with listed targets, especially for value acquirers, 
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consistent with US (Chang, 1998) and UK (Conn et al., 2005) evidence.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.3. Multivariate Analysis  
In this section we assess the combined drivers of the market valuation to M&A 
announcements. We do so with a standard ordinary least squares regression as shown below:  ܥܣܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ߚଵܥݎ݋ݏݏ െ ܤ݋ݎ݀݁ݎ௜ǡ௝ ൅ ߚଶܥݎ݋ݏݏ െ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ǡ௝ ൅ ߚଷܦ݈݁ܽܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௝ ൅ߛܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽܱݓ݊݁ݎݏ݄݅݌௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߜܦ݈݁ܽܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௝ ൅ߠܨ݅ݎ݉ܥ݄ܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎ݅ݏݐ݅ܿݏ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ିଵ ൅ ߮ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܽ݊݀ܻ݁ܽݎܿ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜ǡ௝ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧      (1) 
 ܥܣܴ௜ǡ௝ǡ௧ is the CARs for the event window (-1, +1)8 and the post-event window (+2, +20) for 
acquirer i for M&A deal j at time t. Cross-border is a binary variable equal to one when the 
target is a non-UK firm, and zero otherwise for M&A j. Cross-industry is a binary variable 
equal to one when acquirer and target firms have different 2-digit SIC codes and zero otherwise 
for M&A j. Deal size is the natural logarithm of the deal value for M&A j. Institutional 
ownership, Deal characteristics and Firm characteristics are matrices of institutional owners 
and turnover, M&A deal-specific information and firm-specific characteristics respectively, as 
described earlier in Table 1. Finally, we control for industry and time fixed effects.  
The results on the event window reported in Table 8 show that it is mostly value acquirers 
that are affected by institutional ownership. In particular, consistent with our previous results, 
we find that acquirers with a higher concentration of long-term institutional investors 
experience a lower market reaction on the day of the M&A announcement. The same impact 
is found for domestic and total institutional ownership, suggesting that the presence of 
                                                 
8 The results for the extended event window (-5, +5) remain unaltered and are not reported for brevity.  
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institutional investors minimizes an overreaction to material news such as M&As. Moreover, 
we find that smaller value firms experience a higher market reaction which can be attributed 
to the relatively higher information asymmetries among value firms. Surprisingly though, we 
find no evidence of foreign institutional investors affecting the market reaction or of any other 
deal or firm characteristic having a significant influence. The exception is the negative impact 
of foreign institutional investors on moderate acquirers. We find no evidence of institutional 
investors, deals, or firm characteristics affecting the market reaction to the M&A 
announcement for glamour acquirers.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
The results of the post-announcement valuation drivers show that the financial crisis has a 
negative impact, as expected, for value acquirers. Moreover, we find that more profitable, and 
with lower cash levels, value acquirers have a better post-announcement performance. The 
results of the moderate acquirers show that only the financial crisis has a negative 
post-announcement impact. The evidence on glamour acquirers shows that glamour firms that 
make cash payments have a better post-event performance, as opposed to share payments. 
This is consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Abhyankar et al. (2005), and 
suggests that the market prefers glamour acquirers to pay cash so that the existing 
shareholders will not lose their voting power nor their growth potential and respective stock 
appreciation of the glamour firm. Finally, the presence of domestic and total institutional 
investors has a positive impact on the post-event market reaction, due to their monitoring role 
which can prevent managers from making poor investment decisions (Hartzell and Starks, 
2003; Gaspar et al., 2005). 
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
For further analysis we pool our samples and re-run our regressions while controlling for 
DFTXLUHUV¶ PDUNHW-to-book. As an alternative to the market-to-book ratio we include a 
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categorical variable Glamour category that takes the value of 1 for value acquirers (first 
tercile of market-to-book ratio), 2 for moderate MTBV acquirers (second tercile of 
market-to-book ratio) and 3 for glamour acquirers (third tercile of market-to-book ratio).The 
results are reported in Table 10. Panel A reports the results of the event window (-1, +1) and 
shows that cross-border M&As are not perceived favorably by the market, as suggested by the 
negative coefficient, consistent with Conn et al. (2005) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004). 
However, we do not find any evidence of cross-industry deals affecting the market reaction to 
the M&A announcement. Regarding the impact of institutional investors, we find that 
acquirers with a single, large institutional investor experience a positive market reaction. 
However, a closer examination of the influence of institutional investors shows that the 
presence of domestic or foreign investors has a negative impact on the market reaction during 
the event window. This is similar to the results on total institutional ownership and 
low-turnover institutional ownership, suggesting that, overall, institutional investors, and 
especially long-term oriented investors, mitigate information asymmetries and potentially 
risk-increasing decisions. This is mainly because institutional investors are considered as well 
informed investors, supporting 2¶Neill and Swisher (2003) who find that the degree of 
informed trading and information asymmetry cost component are lower in stocks with 
relatively high institutional ownership. Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Del Guercio (1996) 
VXJJHVWWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVKLIWWKHLULQYHVWPHQWWRZDUGVWKHµJRRG¶
RU µJODPRXU¶ HTXLW\, rather than basing their investment decisions on objective risk 
characteristics, especially for banks and mutual funds. This also supports the argument that 
institutional investors can shape corporate risk-taking activities and monitor firm strategies and 
corporate decision making (Wright et al., 1996), thereby helping WRUHGXFHILUPV¶ULVNOHYHOV
through effectively monitoring management and enhancing corporate decision-making quality 
(Roberts and Yuan, 2010). Overall, these findings are contrary to our hypothesis H4 at least for 
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the market reaction to the M&A announcement.  
The results further show that glamour acquirers, captured by the MTBV ratio or the 
glamour category, have a lower market reaction to the M&A announcement supporting our 
hypothesis H1 and consistent with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). Moreover, we find that 
larger acquirers experience a lower market reaction due to the lower information asymmetries. 
However, we find no evidence of deal size having a significant impact when controlling for 
other firm-, deal- and ownership-specific factors, contrary to Loderer and Martin (1990) who 
argue that acquirers experience greater losses with large deals as they are more likely to 
overpay, especially in the presence of overconfident managers who overestimate their ability to 
extract acquisition benefits and thus overpay (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier and 
Tate, 2008). 
[Insert Table 10 about here]  
When it comes to the post-announcement window (+2, +20) the results of the payment 
method show that cash payments are preferred by the market compared to share payments, 
consistent with our hypothesis H5. Compared to our findings on the market reaction to the 
event window, we find a reversal on the impact of institutional investors. In particular, 
domestic and long-term oriented institutional investors have a positive impact on the 
post-event market reaction. Similarly, a higher ownership by total institutional investors has a 
positive impact. These findings support our hypotheses H3 and H4 for the short-term 
post-announcement performance, suggesting that institutional investors are effective monitors 
E\IRFXVLQJRQWKHPDQDJHUV¶behavior DQGILUPV¶GHYHORSLQJVWUDWHJ\. Moreover, the results of 
the performance between value and glamour acquirers hold for the post-announcement market 
valuation, suggesting that glamour acquirers experience lower returns and this is consistent 
with our hypothesis H1. We further analyze the marginal impact of glamour acquirers with a 
higher institutional ownership, by interacting the market-to-book ratio with domestic 
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institutional ownership. Although we find that glamour firms underperform, glamour 
acquirers with a higher domestic institutional ownership have a significantly better 
post-announcement performance, which supports our hypothesis H2. Finally, we find that 
acquirers with higher leverage have a poor post-announcement performance while other firm- 
or deal-specific characteristics are not significant factors.    
5. Conclusion  
The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the market reaction during 
the short-term period surrounding the announcement of M&As in the UK and evaluate the 
impact of institutional ownership on value and glamour acquirers. We find that value acquirers 
consistently outperform glamour acquirers during M&A announcements and over the 
short-term post-announcement period, in line with Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), while 
contrasting the outperformance of glamour acquirers reported in Rau and Vermaelen (1998). 
Our evidence shows that the market views more favorably firms acquiring targets with cash 
rather than share payments, as reflected by the short-term post-announcement market 
performance. However, there is a positive relationship between domestic institutional 
ownership and post-announcement performance, suggesting that domestic institutional 
investors help to keep a buoyant share performance for glamour acquirers following the M&A 
announcement.  
Moreover, our results show that institutional ownership has a negative relationship with 
announcement returns, including foreign institutional ownership, low-turnover institutional 
ownership and domestic institutional ownership. Following the M&A announcement, 
acquirers where domestic and long-term institutional investors have greater stakes outperform 
their peers. This supports the effective monitoring role of institutional investors and 
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specifically those investors that have a long-term horizon and whose interests are more 
aligned with those of the firms in which they have invested. In addition, we find that glamour 
acquirers underperform compared to their peers, but glamour acquirers with a higher 
concentration of domestic institutional investors have a better post-announcement performance. 
Finally, we find that cross-border deals result in a lower market reaction only during the M&A 
announcement, due to the transaction costs and information asymmetries associated with 
cross-border M&As. 
Our findings should be treated with a caveat regarding the relationship between 
institutional ownership, firm size, and respective information asymmetries. For instance, 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) suggest that institutional investors prefer large firms, whereas 
Hussain (2000) reports that UK institutional investors prefer smaller and widely held firms. 
The purpose of this paper is not to document and test the investment preferences of different 
types of institutional investors, but rather to assess the information asymmetries and 
respective market valuations, as well as the extent to which they are driven by varying types 
of institutional investors that are already present in a firm, for significant events such as 
M&As. The establishment of the causality and directional effects between different types of 
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Table 1 Description of variables 
Variables Description 
Panel A: Firm-level Institutional Ownership variables 
 
Largest Institutional Ownership Percentage shareholdings held by the largest institutional investor in the acquirer firm at the year-end prior to the 
deal announcement (Thomson Reuters). 
Top 5 Institutional Ownership Cumulative percentage shareholdings held by the top 5 institutional investors in the acquirer firm at the year-end prior 
to the deal announcement (Thomson Reuters). 
Domestic Institutional Ownership Cumulative percentage shareholdings held by UK institutional investors in the acquirer firm at the year-end prior to 
the deal announcement (Thomson Reuters). 
Foreign Institutional Ownership Cumulative percentage shareholdings held by non-UK institutional investors in the acquirer firm at the year-end prior 
to the deal announcement (Thomson Reuters). 
Total Institutional Ownership Cumulative percentage shareholdings held by all institutional investors in the acquirer firm at the year-end prior deal 
announcement (Thomson Reuters). 
Low-turnover Institutional Ownership Binary variable equal to one for shareholdings held by institutional investors with annual portfolio turnover rate less 
than or equal to 50% at the year-end prior deal announcement and zero otherwise (Thomson Reuters). 
Moderate-turnover Institutional 
Ownership 
Binary variable equal to one for shareholdings held by institutional investors with annual portfolio turnover rate 
greater than 50% and less than or equal to 100% at the year-end prior the deal announcement and zero otherwise 
(Thomson Reuters). 
High-turnover Institutional Ownership Binary variable equal to one for shareholdings held by institutional investors with annual portfolio turnover rate 
greater than 100% at the year-end prior the deal announcement and zero otherwise (Thomson Reuters). 
Panel B Firm-specific control variables 
 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets of acquirer firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope). 
ROA Return on assets of acquirer firm at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope).  
Leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope).  
Cash & Equivalent Ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement (Worldscope). 




Share Turnover Number of shares traded divided by number of shares outstanding at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement 
(Worldscope). 
Market-to-book ratio Market value of equity divided by book value of assets at the year-end prior to the M&A announcement 
(Worldscope). 
Glamour category Categorical variable that takes the value of 1 for value acquirers (first tercile of market-to-book ratio), 2 for 
moderate MTBV acquirers (second tercile of market-to-book ratio) and 3 for glamour acquirers (third tercile of 
market-to-book ratio). 
Panel C: M&A deal-related variables 
 
Deal size  Deal value in millions of GBP pounds (Bureau van Dijk)  
Cross-border  Binary variable equal to one when the target is a non-UK firm, and zero otherwise (Bureau van Dijk) 
High-tech Binary variable equal to one when the target firm belongs to the high-technology industry and zero otherwise (Bureau 
van Dijk). 
Cross Industry Binary variable equal to one when acquirer and target firms have different 2-digit SIC codes and zero otherwise 
(Bureau van Dijk). 
Listed Target Binary variable equal to one when the target firm is a publicly listed firm and zero otherwise (Bureau van Dijk). 
Cash Payment Binary variable equal to one if the M&A deal employs cash only as payment method and zero otherwise (Bureau van 
Dijk). 
Share Payment Binary variable equal to one if the M&A deal employs share only as payment method and zero otherwise (Bureau 
van Dijk).  
Financial Crisis Binary variable equal to one if the M&A deal is announced during the 2007-2008 crisis period and zero otherwise 
(Bureau van Dijk).  
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Table 2 Annual distribution of UK mergers and acquisitions sample.  
The table presents the annual distribution of deal number, mean of deal value and median of deal 
value (millions of GBP) for completed domestic and cross-border M&As announced by UK listed 
acquirers between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2010. 
 
Domestic Cross-border Total 



















2000 134 65.98 8.73 104 1418.63 19.00 238 657.05 12.33 
2001 114 33.70 7.30 84 85.72 14.45 198 55.77 9.40 
2002 115 38.42 6.50 88 174.73 21.56 203 97.51 9.74 
2003 101 58.17 5.50 69 88.95 10.50 170 70.66 6.88 
2004 133 74.12 7.40 86 63.18 22.74 219 69.82 11.00 
2005 182 43.26 7.15 101 101.30 11.50 283 63.97 8.46 
2006 183 31.70 7.00 133 115.07 10.71 316 66.79 8.58 
2007 218 51.80 8.15 135 199.52 13.61 353 108.29 9.90 
2008 128 32.66 6.40 114 117.46 15.70 242 72.61 9.93 
2009 90 24.66 5.97 65 105.37 11.83 155 58.51 8.60 
2010 121 22.92 4.82 84 55.69 15.93 205 36.35 6.98 




Table 3 Descriptive statistics  
The market-to-book value (MTBV) is the ratio of the market capitalization of acquirerV¶ equity to the book value of equity at the year-end prior to the 
announcement date. Acquirers are ranked into three equally-weighted terciles based on their MTBV: 797 value (low MTBV), 797 moderate, and 798 glamour 
(high MTBV). The variable description is in Table1  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of deal characteristics: 
 
 
Value (Low MTBV) Moderate MTBV Glamour (High MTBV) 
 
Domestic Cross-border Total Domestic Cross-border Total Domestic Cross-border Total 
Mean MTBV ratio 0.49 0.53 0.51 1.07 1.10 1.08 3.30 2.91 3.11 
Median MTBV ratio 0.49 0.57 0.53 1.06 1.10 1.08 2.27 2.14 2.18 
Sample size 500 297 797 473 322 797 407 391 798 
Average deal value (mil. GBP) 50.85 103.70 70.55 37.81 145.36 81.32 53.91 458.68 251.99 
Total deal value (mil. GBP) 25,426.99 30,799.24 56,226.24 17,929.86 46,804.81 64,734.67 21,988.13 179,341.90 201,330.10 







Cash 345 209 554 323 195 518 226 256 482 
Share 70 22 92 67 32 99 94 50 144 
High-tech targets 60 22 82 65 44 109 94 78 172 
Cross-industry deals 311 183 494 303 203 506 245 223 468 




Value (Low MTBV) Moderate MTBV Glamour (High MTBV)   
 





Deal size (mil. GBP) 797 70.55 8.50 797 81.22 10.00 798 252.22 10.18 (0311) (0.058) * 
Largest institutional ownership  758 9.885 9.210 776 9.121 8.355 762 8.785 7.405 (0.001) *** (0.000) *** 
Top 5 institutional ownership 758 26.95 26.65 776 25.34 25.36 762 24.10 23.94 (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
Domestic institutional ownership 758 42.49 42.93 776 42.63 44.42 762 38.73 38.56 (0.001) *** (0.002) *** 
Foreign institutional ownership 758 10.42 5.02 776 10.01 5.79 763 12.97 7.54 (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
Low-turnover institutional ownership 758 40.68 42.17 776 40.55 41.95 762 38.29 40.17 (0.074) * (0.081) * 
Median-turnover institutional owner. 758 1.16 0.31 776 1.11 0.42 762 1.38 0.59 (0.083) * (0.251) 
High-turnover institutional owner. 758 6.82 5.85 776 7.04 5.83 762 7.51 6.53 (0.072) * (0.031) ** 
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Total institutional ownership 758 52.91 56.69 776 52.64 55.61 762 51.71 56.98 (0.673) (0.835) 
Firm size (total assets mil. GBP) 797 5,982.3 330.8 797 4,091.1 206.4 798 2,178.5 146.6 (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
ROA 797 -0.01 0.03 796 0.03 0.06 798 0.03 0.09 (0.001) *** (0.000) *** 
Leverage 790 0.21 0.18 794 0.17 0.17 792 0.15 0.10 (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
Cash & equivalent 797 0.10 0.07 797 0.14 0.09 798 0.22 0.16 (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
Dividend yield 792 3.19 3.01 792 2.34 2.16 776 1.55 1.30 (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
Share turnover 778 0.88 0.71 778 0.82 0.67 741 0.99 0.79 (0.000) *** (0.001) *** 
Market-to-book ratio 797 0.51 0.53 797 1.08 1.08 798 3.11 2.18 (0.000) *** (0.000) *** 
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Figure 1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Domestic vs. Cross-border M&As.   
This figure presents the daily cumulative average abnormal returns around the M&A 
announcement date for domestic and cross-border M&As using a standard event study 
methodology. The abnormal returns are estimated based on the one-factor OLS market model with 
the FTSE ALL share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The sample contains 2,582 
M&As which include 1,519 domestic deals and 1,063 cross-border deals from January 1, 2000 to 
December 31, 2010. 
 
 
Figure 2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Value acquirers vs. Glamour acquirers. 
 
This figure presents the daily cumulative average abnormal returns around the M&A announcement 
date for value and glamour acquirers, from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010, using a standard 
event study methodology. The abnormal returns are estimated based on the one-factor OLS market 
model with the FTSE ALL share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. Acquirers are ranked 
into three equally-weighted terciles based on their MTBV: 797 value (low MTBV), 797 moderate, 
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Table 4 Market reaction to M&As for UK acquirers on different event windows. 
This table presents the CARs around M&A announcements. The abnormal returns are estimated as with the standard OLS market adjusted returns with the 
FTSE ALL Share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The sample contains 2,582 M&A which include 1,519 domestic deals and 1,063 cross-border 
deals from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level 
respectively.  









Differences across CARs 





Differences across CARs 
(Value vs. Glamour) 
(-20,-2) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.004* 0.006** 
 
(-1.734)* (-1.132) (-1.389) (0.215) (1.098) (-1.788) (2.080) 
(-1,+1) 0.598*** 0.763*** 0.363*** 0.400** 0.747*** 0.219* 0.527*** 
 
(7.381) (6.304) (3.874) (0.015) (7.034) (1.690) (3.145)  
(0) 0.376*** 0.487*** 0.217*** 0.270** 0.465*** 0.136 0.329*** 
 
(6.128) (5.281) (3.133) (0.030) (6.220) (1.327) (2.597) 
(-5,+5) 0.555*** 0.709*** 0.335** 0.374 0.900*** 0.181 0.719*** 
 
(4.884) (4.243) (2.423) (0.105) (5.792) (0.900) (2.830) 
(-10,+10) 0.374*** 0.463** 0.248 0.215 1.068*** -0.420 1.488*** 
 (2.595) (2.248) (1.301) (0.462)  (5.241) (-1.602) (4.482) 
(+2,+20) -0.421* -0.529 *** -0.267 -0.262 0.223 -0.982*** 1.205*** 
 
(-1.744) (-3.497) (-1.660) (-1.163) (1.344) (-2.264) (4.373) 
(-20,+20) 0.015  0.062 -0.124 0.186 1.161 *** -1.145*** 2.306*** 
 
(-0.078) (0.222) (-0.477) (0.469)  (4.218) (-3.001) (4.900) 
N 2,582 1,519 1,063 
 
797 798  
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Table 5 $QQRXQFHPHQWSHULRG8.DFTXLUHUV¶&$5VVRUWLQJby market-to-book value. 
This table presents average CARs around M&As announcements and computed using an event study methodology. The abnormal returns are estimated as 
the market adjusted returns with the FTSE ALL share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The sample contains 2,582 M&A, including 1,519 
domestic deals and 1,063 cross-border deals from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. The market-to-book value (MTBV) is the ratio of the market 
FDSLWDOL]DWLRQ RI DFTXLUHU ILUP¶V HTXLW\ WR WKH ERRN YDOXH RI HTXLW\ DW WKH \HDU-end prior to the announcement date. Acquirers are ranked into three 
equally-weighted terciles based on their MTBV: 797 value (low MTBV), 797 moderate, and 798 glamour (high MTBV). t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level respectively. 
 Event Window 






Differences across CARs 
(Domestic vs. Cross-border) 
Value acquirers: (-20,-2) 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003 
  (1.098) (1,259) (0.125) (0.695) 
 (-1,+1) 0.747*** 0.859*** 0.558*** 0.301 
  (7.034) (6.349) (3.267) (1.369) 
 
(0) 0.465*** 0.530*** 0.355*** 0.175 
  (6.220) (5.113) (3.597) (1.130) 
 
(-5,+5) 0.900*** 1.042*** 0.661** 0.381 
  (5.792) (5.177) (2.722) (1.186) 
 (-10,+10) 1.068*** 1.214*** 0.823*** 0.391 
  (5.241) (4.689) (2.489) (0.928) 
 
(2,+20) 0.223 0.227 0.217 -0.010 
  (1.344) (1.064) (0.820) (-0.029) 
 
(-20,+20) 1.161 *** 1.369*** 0.809* 0.560 
  (4.218) (3.911) (1.820) (0.985) 
 N 797 500 297   
Moderate acquirers: (-20,-2) -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 
  (-0.475) (-0.139) (-0.619) (0.349) 
 (-1,+1) 0.547*** 0.693*** 0.333*** 0.360 
  (4.680) (3.848) (2.905) (1.510) 
 
(0) 0.354*** 0.479*** 0.169** 0.310* 
  (4.188) (3.610) (2.327) (1.802) 
 
(-5,+5) 0.503*** 0.700** 0.211 0.489 
  (2.750) (2.615) (0.958) (1.315) 
 (-10,+10) 0.470** 0.628* 0.237 0.391 
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  (2.050) (1.887) (0.832) (0.838) 
 
(2,+20) -0.124 -0.194 -0.022 -0.171 
  (-0.698) (-0.771) (-0.090) (-0.465) 
 
(-20,+20) 0.340 0.467 0.154 0.312 
  (1.175) (1.117) (0.420) (0.529) 
 N 797 475 322   
Glamour acquirers: (-20,-2) -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
  (-1.788) (-1.338) (-1.187) (-0.251) 
 (-1,+1) 0.219* 0.329* 0.105 0.224 
  (1.690) (1.710) (0.607) (0.861) 
 
(0) 0.136 0.241 0.026 0.215 
  (1.327) (1.589) (0.191) (1.051) 
 
(-5,+5) 0.181 0.175 0.186 -0.011 
  (0.900) (0.577) (0.713) (-0.027) 
 (-10,+10) -0.420 -0.537 -0.297 -0.240 
  (-1.602) (-1.388) (-0.845) (-0.457) 
 
(2,+20) -0.982*** -1.135*** -0.824*** -0.311 
  (-2.264) (-3.502) (-2.775) -(0.706) 
 
(-20,+20) -1.145*** -1.241** -1.046** -0.195 
  (-3.001) (-2.151) (-2.106) (-0.255) 
 N 798 407 391  
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Table 6 Univariate Sorting of CARs.  
This table presents the CARs for selected windows around M&A announcements and computed 
using an event study methodology. The abnormal returns are estimated as the market adjusted 
returns with the FTSE ALL share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The sample contains 
2,582 M&As which includes 1,519 domestic deals and 1,306 cross-border deals undertaken by UK 
listed companies from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. Each deal is split between value 
(below median market-to-book) and glamour (above median market-to-book) acquirers for domestic 
and cross-border M&As respectively.  
 Domestic Cross-border 
 Below Above t-statistic Below Above t-statistic 
Deal size 
(-1, +1) 0.679 0.874 (-0.794) 0.517 0.259 (1.350) 
(-5, +5) 0.728 0.683 (0.136) 0.411 0.284 (0.452) 
(+2,+20) -0.361 -0.752 (1.279) -0.140 -0.352 (0.648) 
N  868 651  429 634  
Largest institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 0,752 0.728 (0.094) 0.293 0.404 (-0.594) 
(-5, +5) 0.642 0.843 (-0.567) 0.169 0.569 (-1.413) 
(+2,+20) -0.625 -0.076 (-1.844)* -0.679 0.112 (-2.439) ** 
N  693 724  513 480  
Top 5 institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 0.885 0.594 (1.170) 0.332 0.361 (-0.154) 
(-5, +5) 0.931 0.548 (1.131) 0.279 0.445 (-0.588) 
(+2,+20) -0.624 -0.062 (-1.888) * -0.779 0.185 (-2.978) *** 
N 711 706  496 497  
Domestic institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 1.016 0.448 (2.283) ** 0.346 0.348 (-0.012) 
(-5, +5) 1.055 0.408 (1.913) * 0.411 0.316 (0.334) 
(+2,+20) -0.650 -0.021 (-2.112)** -0.410 -0.192 (-0.670) 
N 727 690  478 515  
Foreign institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 0.898 0.494 (1.589) 0.598 0.204 (2.005) ** 
(-5, +5) 0.921 0.459 (1.333) 0.362 0.348 (0.047)  
(+2,+20) -0.390 -0.272 (-0.386) -0.672 -0.077 (-1.737) * 
N 862 555  344 650  
Low-turnover institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 0.941 0.498 (1.772) * 0.367 0.331 (0.194) 
(-5, +5) 1.043 0.376 (1.963) ** 0.344 0.376 (-0.110) 
(+2,+20) -0.691 0.073 (-2.557)** -0.696 0.011 (-2.161) ** 
N 773 644  432 561  
Moderate-turnover institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 0.815 0.654 (0.644) 0.562 0.167 (2.114) ** 
(-5, +5) 0.846 0.619 (0.669) 0.413 0.320 (0.328) 
(+2,+20) -0.684 0.044 (-2.441) ** -0.468 -0.154 (-0.960) 
N 755 662  452 541  
High-turnover institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 0.995 0.379 (2.445) ** 0.594 0.193 (2.089) ** 
(-5, +5) 0.924 0.481 (1.288)  0.484 0.287 (0.676) 
(+2,+20) -0.472 -0.164 (-1.016) -0.449 -0.203 (-0.738) 
N 829 588  380 613  
Total institutional ownership 
(-1, +1) 0.932 0.498 (1.731) * 0.479 0.251 (1.206) 
(-5, +5) 1.045 0.357 (2.024) ** 0.494 0.266 (0.797) 
(+2,+20) -0.642 0.030 (-2.243)** -0.563 -0.104 (-1.394) 
N 789 628  418 575  
Firm size 
(-1, +1) 0.735 0.400 (1.629) 0.581 0.163 (2.207) ** 
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(-5, +5) 0.718 0.391 (1.079) 0.303 0.364 (-0.206)  
(+2,+20) -0.673 -0.090 (-1.907) -0.555 -0.097 (-1.343) 
N 865 573  366 658  
ROA 
(-1, +1) 0.706 0.488 (1.081) 0.365 0.273 (0.503) 
(-5, +5) 0.724 0.441 (0.948) 0.366 0.321 (0.162) 
(+2,+20) -0.760 -0.085 (-2.274)** -0.226 -0.288 (0.188) 
N 756 681  474 549  
Leverage 
(-1, +1) 0.555 0.626 (-0.350)  0.436 0.220 (1.186) 
(-5, +5) 0.424 0.686 (-0.885) 0.481 0.238 (0.856) 
(+2,+20) -0.687 -0.232 (-1.514) -0.009 -0.472 (1.408) 
N 739 690  485 532  
Cash & equivalent 
(-1, +1) 0.612 0.590 (0.107) 0.323 0.303 (0.112) 
(-5, +5) 0.646 0.524 (0.410) 0.295 0.383 (-0.310) 
(+2,+20) 0.039 -0.481 (1.693) * -0.281 -0.242 (-0.120) 
N 758 680  473 551  
Dividend yield 
(-1, +1) 0.808 0.431 (1.743) * 0.242 0.374 (-0.723) 
(-5, +5) 0.748 0.610 (0.451) 0.260 0.399 (-0.493) 
(+2,+20) -0.796 0.317 (-3.747) *** -0.446 -0.070 (-1.181) 
N 742 662  476 541  
Share turnover 
(-1, +1) 0.843 0.464 (1.671) * 0.479 0.245 (1.239) 
(-5, +5) 0.961 0.496 (1.458)  0.460 0.294 (0.563) 
(+2,+20) 0.039 -0.481 (1.693) * -0.524 -0.028 (-1.512) 
N 798 545  367 619  
Market-to-book  
(-1, +1) 0.812 0.449 (1.860) * 0.450 0.201 (1.348) 
(-5, +5) 1.004 0.274 (2.463) ** 0.475 0.221 (0.888) 
(+2,+20) 0.115 -0.832 (3.143) *** 0.136 -0.579 (2.215) ** 





Table 7 Announcement returns sorted E\DFTXLUHUV¶MTBV 
This table presents average CARs around M&A announcements computed using an event 
study methodology. The abnormal returns are estimated as the market adjusted returns with 
the FTSE ALL share index as the proxy for the market portfolio. The total sample contains 
2,582 M&As which includes 1,519 domestic deals and 1,063 cross-border deals from January 
1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. Acquirers are ranked into three equally-weighted terciles based 
on their MTBV: value (low MTBV), moderate, and glamour (high MTBV). t-statistics and 
number of observations are reported in parentheses. *** , ** and * denote significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, 0.1 level respectively. 
Panel A: CAR (-1, +1) 
 Value acquirer Moderate acquirer Glamour acquirer Total 
High-tech target 0.924*** 0.371 0.078 0.449** 
 
(3.317, 82) (1.116, 109) (0.222, 172) (2.229, 408) 
Non-high-tech target 0.726 0.576 0.258 0.626*** 
 
(6.374, 715) (4.606, 688) (1.916, 627) (7.073,2174) 
Cross-industry deal 0.722*** 0.580*** 0.341** 0.673*** 
 
(5.532, 494) (4.324, 505) (1.981, 468) (6.013, 1572) 
Intra-industry deal  0.787*** 0.492** 0.045 0.482*** 
 
(4.347,303) (2.234, 291) (0.231, 330) (4.297, 1010) 
Listed target 0.101 1.126 -0.256 0.146 
 
(0.230,17) (0.999, 20) (-0.749, 30) (0.383, 72) 
Unlisted target 0.761*** 0.533*** 0.238* 0.611*** 
 
(7.044, 780) (4.569, 777) (1.774, 769) (7.395, 2510) 
Cash payment 0.691*** 0.575*** 0.246* 0.540*** 
 
(5.890, 579) (5.540, 551) (1.923, 509) (6.835, 1753) 
Share payment  1.086** 0.760 0.201 1.209*** 
    (2.340, 92) (1.059, 99) (0.423, 144) (3.189, 382) 
Panel B: CAR (-5, +5) 
 Value acquirer Moderate acquirer Glamour acquirer Total 
High-tech target 0.679 0.147 -0.129 0.193 
 
(1.474, 82) (0.302, 109) (-0.233, 172) (0.653, 408) 
Non-high-tech target 0.925*** 0.560*** 0.265 0.623*** 
 
(5.607, 715) (2.835, 688) (1.288, 627) (5.065,2174) 
Cross-industry deal 0.952*** 0.672*** 0.475* 0.737*** 
 
(5.045, 494) (2.948, 505) (1.965, 468) (4.874, 1572) 
Intra-industry deal  0.814*** 0.212 -0.239 0.272 
 
(3.024,303) (0.690, 291) (-0.699, 330) (1.600, 1010) 
Listed target 2.244** 2.237 0.250 0.876 
 
(2.619,17) (0.706, 20) (0.287, 30) (0.868, 72) 
Unlisted target 0.870*** 0.459*** 0.177 0.546*** 
 
(5.525, 780) (2.704, 777) (0.862, 769) (4.827, 2510) 
Cash payment 0.970*** 0.644*** 0.397** 0.683*** 
 
(5.570, 579) (3.333, 551) (2.030, 509) (5.685 1753) 
Share payment  0.529 0.346 -0.550 0.398 
    (0.905, 92) (0.397, 99) (-0.816, 144) (0.891, 382) 
Panel C: CAR (+2, +20) 
 Value acquirer Moderate acquirer Glamour acquirer Total 
High-tech target -0.708 -0.839 -1.448*** -1,179 
 
(-1.053, 82) (-1.130, 109) (-2.813, 172) (-, 408) 
Non-high-tech target 0.330** -0.011 0.258 -0.279 
 
(1.964, 715) (-0.064, 688) (1.916, 627) (-1.029,2174) 
Cross-industry deal 0.101 -0.115 -1.015*** -0.460 
 
(0.477, 494) (-0.488, 505) (-3.664, 468) (-0.878, 1572) 
Intra-industry deal  0.442 -0.141 0.045 -0.361* 
 
(1.578,303) (-0.507, 291) (0.231, 330) (1.702, 1010) 
Listed target 1.810 0.256 -0.515 -0.275 
 
(1.111,17) (0.173, 20) (-0.558, 30) (0.709, 72) 




(1.136, 780) (-0.740, 777) (1.774, 769) (-1.934, 2510) 
Cash payment 0.435** 0.075 -0.568** 0.035 
 
(2.283, 579) (0.403, 551) (-2.310, 509) (0.448, 1753) 
Share payment  -0.330 -0.720 -2.821*** -0.697*** 





Table 8 Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns - event window (-1, +1) 
This table presents the results of regression estimates of different deal- and investor-specific characteristics for the event window (-1,+1). t-statistics based on 
cluster-adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009), hence, providing robust interpretations (Cameron et al., 2008) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate the significance level at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 respectively.  
 Value acquirers Moderate acquirers Glamour acquirers  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Cross-border -0.143 -0.100 -0.219 -0.095  -0.138 -0.248 -0.336 -0.296  -0.077 -0.105 -0.110 -0.207  
 (-0.572) (-0.393) (-0.900) (-0.398)  (-0.648) (-1.094) (-1.278) (-1.252)  (-0.258) (-0.352) (-0.378) (-0.759)  
Cross industry -0.188 -0.157 -0.062 -0.103  0.132 0.136 0.135 0.144  0.166 0.189 0.437 0.230  
 (-0.732) (-0.607) (-0.231) (-0.404)  (0.522) (0.545) (0.437) (0.527)  (0.604) (0.688) (1.522) (0.849)  
Cash payment   -0.128     -0.047     -0.073   
   (-0.378)     (-0.100)     (-0.195)   
Share payment 0.153 0.048    -0.262 -0.266    0.050 0.061    
 (0.308) (0.096)    (-0.416) (-0.414)    (0.096) (0.117)    
Financial crisis 0.363     0.554     0.635     
 (0.747)     (0.622)     (0.871)     
Largest institutional  
ownership 
-0.000     0.031     0.042     
 (-0.019)     (0.893)     (1.129)     
Top 5 institutional ownership  0.022     0.014     0.026    
  (1.439)     (0.684)     (0.999)    
Low-turnover  institutional 
 ownership 
 -0.023**     -0.004     -0.016    
  (-2.521)     (-0.426)     (-1.175)    
Foreign institutional  
ownership 
-0.003     -0.025**     -0.013     
 (-0.349)     (-2.458)     (-1.401)     
Domestic institutional 
 ownership 
  -0.012*  -0.010*   0.003  0.007   0.003  0.001 
   (-1.704)  (-1.673)   (0.472)  (0.901)   (0.392)  (0.137) 
Total institutional 
 ownership 
   -0.010*     -0.002     -0.003  
    (-1.856)     (-0.499)     (-0.450)  
Deal Size -0.060 -0.016 -0.067 -0.058  0.116 0.099 0.051 0.050  -0.018 -0.014 -0.013 -0.001  
 (-0.774) (-0.200) (-0.950) (-0.890)  (0.946) (0.801) (0.474) (0.577)  (-0.259) (-0.199) (-0.168) (-0.009)  
Firm size      -0.647***     -0.117     -0.290 
     (-3.700)     (-0.496)     (-1.202) 
ROA -0.164 -0.096 -0.213 -0.373 0.404 -2.207 -2.133 -2.500 -2.354 -1.915 -0.709 -0.630 -0.869 -0.425 -0.547 
 (-0.156) (-0.093) (-0.260) (-0.419) (0.410) (-1.236) (-1.199) (-1.275) (-1.230) (-1.011) (-0.564) (-0.510) (-0.600) (-0.353) (-0.450) 
Leverage -0.586 -0.422   0.033 -0.646 -0.621   -0.523 0.605 0.558   0.466 
 (-0.774) (-0.582)   (0.044) (-0.775) (-0.751)   (-0.701) (0.853) (0.812)   (0.684) 
Cash & equivalent 1.415 1.251   0.548 0.720 0.708   0.754 -0.476 -0.817   -0.839 
 (0.905) (0.799)   (0.351) (0.572) (0.530)   (0.598) (-0.373) (-0.587)   (-0.609) 
Turnover rate -0.241 -0.078   0.173 -0.128 -0.295   -0.208 -0.183 -0.204   -0.142 
 (-0.993) (-0.417)   (1.005) (-0.422) (-0.976)   (-0.487) (-0.769) (-0.927)   (-0.603) 
Dividend yield 0.040 0.056   0.063 -0.049 -0.053   -0.057 0.097 0.139   0.142 
 (0.631) (0.892)   (1.041) (-0.973) (-1.074)   (-0.876) (0.897) (1.299)   (1.310) 
Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
_cons 0.735 1.506** 1.951*** 1.571*** 4.372*** -0.138 0.923 1.082** -0.139 0.614 -0.498 -0.328 -0.792 0.053 1.307 
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 (1.161) (2.143) (2.928) (3.084) (4.000) (-0.137) (1.342) (2.047) (-0.181) (0.350) (-0.621) (-0.414) (-1.059) (0.072) (0.821) 
Obs. 740 740 684 758 740 757 757 683 775 757 709 709 685 762 709 





Table 9 Regressions of announcement period abnormal returns ± post-event window (+2,+20) 
This table presents the results of regression estimates of different deal- and investor-specific characteristics for the post-event window (+2, +20). t-statistics based 
on cluster-adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009), hence, providing robust interpretations (Cameron et al., 2008) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate the significance level at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 respectively.  
 Value acquirers Moderate acquirers Glamour acquirers  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Cross-border -0.374 -0.384 -0.324 -0.300  0.082 0.073 -0.002 0.040  -0.249 -0.263 0.159 0.011  
 (-1.136) (-1.140) (-0.885) (-0.928)  (0.209) (0.182) (-0.006) (0.110)  (-0.565) (-0.604) (0.331) (0.027)  
Cross industry -0.148 -0.154 -0.359 -0.279  -0.006 -0.051 0.261 0.112  -0.432 -0.387 -0.139 -0.091  
 (-0.446) (-0.467) (-1.021) (-0.865)  (-0.015) (-0.117) (0.664) (0.261)  (-0.969) (-0.856) (-0.282) (-0.194)  
Cash payment   0.649     0.728     1.186**   
   (1.240)     (1.428)     (2.359)   
Share payment -0.302 -0.334    -0.777 -0.675    -1.323* -1.323*    
 (-0.460) (-0.511)    (-0.981) (-0.835)    (-1.867) (-1.900)    
Financial crisis -2.422***     -2.697*     -0.178     
 (-2.716)     (-1.830)     (-0.121)     
Largest institutional  
ownership 
0.022     0.040     0.023     
 (0.657)     (1.289)     (0.631)     
Top 5 institutional ownership  0.020     -0.005     0.032    
  (0.992)     (-0.226)     (1.221)    
Low-turnover  institutional 
 ownership 
 -0.005     0.016     -0.014    
  (-0.393)     (0.992)     (-0.818)    
Foreign institutional  
ownership 
0.001     0.010     -0.005     
 (0.037)     (0.541)     (-0.333)     
Domestic institutional 
 ownership 
  0.002  0.003   0.003  0.005   0.021**  0.004 
   (0.253)  (0.462)   (0.473)  (0.715)   (2.217)  (0.383) 
Total institutional 
 ownership 
   0.005     0.003     0.017**  
    (0.799)     (0.436)     (2.171)  
Deal Size 0.032 0.042 -0.004 0.025  0.077 0.056 0.001 0.014  -0.004 0.018 -0.005 0.022  
 (0.318) (0.416) (-0.035) (0.262)  (0.746) (0.552) (0.011) (0.135)  (-0.031) (0.141) (-0.037) (0.184)  
Firm size      -0.039     0.155     0.067 
     (-0.177)     (0.640)     (0.222) 
ROA 2.515 2.505 3.048* 3.092* 2.594 1.925 1.915 -0.794 1.295 2.126 -0.565 -0.553 0.835 0.608 -0.347 
 (1.392) (1.380) (1.746) (1.782) (1.446) (0.547) (0.555) (-0.414) (0.436) (0.622) (-0.461) (-0.455) (0.606) (0.502) (-0.275) 
Leverage -1.374 -1.257   -1.377 0.598 0.381   0.523 -2.489 -2.300   -2.554* 
 (-1.427) (-1.305)   (-1.412) (0.384) (0.258)   (0.342) (-1.585) (-1.477)   (-1.727) 
Cash & equivalent -3.087 -3.083*   -3.199* 2.932 3.353   3.313 -2.055 -2.286   -1.993 
 (-1.642) (-1.652)   (-1.721) (1.352) (1.453)   (1.478) (-1.301) (-1.348)   (-1.118) 
Turnover rate 0.291 0.320   0.244 -0.456 -0.546   -0.392 0.216 0.229   0.138 
 (1.290) (1.605)   (1.071) (-0.938) (-1.113)   (-0.889) (0.615) (0.704)   (0.388) 
Dividend yield -0.042 -0.040   -0.034 0.055 0.033   0.072 0.473*** 0.501***   0.524*** 
 (-0.465) (-0.438)   (-0.384) (0.393) (0.218)   (0.515) (2.998) (3.205)   (3.455) 
Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
_cons 1.759* 0.881 0.513 -0.465 0.040 0.877 -0.874 -0.756 1.534 0.262 0.002 -0.329 -1.902 -0.992 -1.109 
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 (1.692) (0.841) (0.464) (-0.524) (0.028) (0.688) (-0.859) (-0.915) (1.136) (0.135) (0.001) (-0.173) (-1.204) (-0.665) (-0.420) 
Obs. 740 740 684 758 740 757 757 683 775 757 709 709 685 762 709 
Adj. R2 (%) 2.445 2.567 2.282 2.307 2.750 0.726 0.764 0.691 0.095 0.802 6.479 6.649 7.753 6.287 6.231 
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Table 10 Pooled regressions of announcement period abnormal returns  
This table presents the results of regression estimates of different deal- and investor-specific characteristics. 
Panel A reports the results for the event window (-1,+1). Panel B reports the results for the post-event 
window (+2, +20). t-statistics based on cluster-adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009), hence, 
providing robust interpretations (Cameron et al., 2008) are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
the significance level at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 respectively. 
Panel A.  CAR(-1, +1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Cross-border -0.280* -0.301* -0.324** -0.288* -0.285* -0.211 -0.225 -0.331** -0.280* -0.123 
 
(-1.791) (-1.928) (-2.188) (-1.822) (-1.836) (-1.391) (-1.525) (-2.109) (-1.910) (-0.736) 
Cross industry 0.129 0.177 0.068 0.134 0.129 0.06 0.105 0.121 0.068 0.154 
 
(0.707) (0.977) (0.402) (0.735) (0.698) (-0.366) (-0.628) (-0.653) (-0.402) (-0.821) 
High-tech target 
     
-0.023 
   
0.003 
      
(-0.083) 

















Share payment 0.110 
  
0.161 0.088 -0.035





(0.378) (0.205) (-0.106) 
   
(-0.757) 
Financial crisis 
         
0.024 
          
(-0.058) 
Largest institutional  
ownership 








Top 5 institutional 
ownership 
     
0.016 
   
0.005 
      
(1.412) 
   
(-0.224) 
Foreign institutional 























   
(-1.862) 






















        
  
(1.529) 
        Total institutional  
Ownership 
    
-0.005* 
   
-0.007** 
 
     
(-1.654) 
   
(-2.357) 
 Deal Size -0.011 0.057 -0.02 -0.009 -0.016 0.031 0.026 -0.024 -0.004 0.095 
 
(-0.196) (0.998) (-0.395) (-0.148) (-0.307) (-0.559) (-0.480) (-0.427) (-0.076) (-1.622) 
Firm size  
         
-0.382* 
          
(-1.753) 
ROA 
     
-0.908
   
-0.884 
      
(-1.074) 
   
(-0.938) 
Leverage 
     
-0.169 
   
0.036 
      
(-0.382) 
   
(-0.076) 
Cash & equivalent 
     
0.159 
   
-0.339 
      
(-0.189) 
   
(-0.365) 
Turnover rate 
     
-0.156 
   
-0.041 
      
(-1.169) 
   
(-0.243) 
Dividend yield 
     
-0.004 
   
-0.019 
      
(-0.095) 








-0.160** -0.168*** -0.198** 





(-2.450) (-2.854) (-2.438) 
Glamour category  -0.248** 




   
 
(-2.557) 








       
   
(1.250) 
       Market-to-book x Foreign 
institutional ownership 
   
0.003 
      
    
(0.711) 
      Cons -0.085 1.194 0.898 -0.369 0.229 1.242 0.672 0.006 0.936 2.718 
 
(-0.075) (1.241) (0.984) (-0.319) (0.197) (-1.366) (-0.724) (-0.006) (-1.055) (-1.513) 
Industry/Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Obs. 2,054 2,410 2,296 2,054 2,053 2,206 2,296 2,053 2,296 1,969 




Panel B. CAR(+2, +20) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Cross-border -0.040 -0.030 0.010 -0.039 -0.106 -0.131 -0.009 -0.017 -0.046 -0.13 
 
(-0.152) (-0.128) (0.041) (-0.147) (-0.410) (-0.540) (-0.038) (-0.067) (-0.195) (-0.496) 
Cross industry -0.238 -0.268 -0.183 -0.239 -0.248 -0.35 -0.221 -0.252 -0.244 -0.349 
 
(-0.996) (-1.141) (-0.791) (-1.008) (-1.026) (-1.522) (-0.943) (-1.047) (-1.052) (-1.462) 
High-tech target 
     
-0.470 
   
-0.216 
      
(-0.952) 
   
(-0.553) 















Share payment -1.003* 
  
-0.867 -0.905 -0.985** 





(-1.541) (-1.595) (-2.387) 
   
(-1.227) 
Financial crisis 
         
-2.480*** 
          
(-3.232) 
Largest institutional  
ownership 








Top 5 institutional 
ownership 
     
0.015 
   
0.034 
      
(1.197) 
   
(1.101) 
Foreign institutional 























   
(-0.050) 






















        
  
(0.718) 
        Total institutional  
Ownership 
    
0.011** 
   
0.011*** 
 
     
(2.443) 
   
(2.763) 
 Deal Size -0.011 0.004 0.040 -0.001 -0.023 0.034 0.019 -0.002 0.026 0.005 
 
(-0.139) (0.060) (0.602) (-0.016) (-0.303) (0.492) (0.281) (-0.021) (0.379) (0.054) 
Firm size  
         
-0.006 
          
(-0.025) 
ROA 
     
0.429 
   
0.458 
      
(0.417) 
   
(0.469) 
Leverage 
     
-1.351* 
   
-1.533** 
      
(-1.880) 
   
(-2.018) 
Cash & equivalent 
     
0.046 
   
-0.541 
      
(0.042) 
   
(-0.472) 
Turnover rate 
     
0.093 
   
0.237 
      
(0.437) 
   
(0.933) 
Dividend yield 
     
0.092 
   
0.100 
      
(1.431) 








-0.427*** -0.441*** -0.350*** 





(-3.508) (-3.901) (-2.781) 
Glamour category  -0.474*** 




   
 
(-3.290) 








       
   
(1.647) 
       Market-to-book x Foreign 
institutional ownership 
   
0.008 
      
    
(1.251) 
      Cons 2.963*** 0.699 1.258 2.781*** 2.340** -1.412 -0.938 0.463 -1.006 0.854 
 
(2.742) (0.763) (1.352) (2.597) (2.163) (-0.968) (-0.721) (0.323) (-0.830) (0.379) 
Industry/Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Obs. 2,054 2,410 2,296 2,054 2,053 2,206 2,296 2,053 2,296 1,969 
Adj. R2 (%) 3.817 2.885 4.460 5.259 4.098 4.164 2.996 5.294 4.303 4.574 
 
 
 
 
 
 
